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CURRENT LEGISLATION
The enactment of the proposed amendment to Section 354 of the
Civil Practice Act would restore the rule of the common law as it
existed before the first codification, by providing:
" * * * But nothing contained in this section shall be con-
strued to disqualify an attorney or his employees in the probate
of a will * * * from becoming a witness as to its preparation
and execution, whether such attorney is, or is not, one of the
subscribing witnesses thereto, * * *"
When a client executes a will it is undoubtedly his intention
that the execution and especially the contents of the will be kept secret
during his life. Obviously such an intent does not prevail after his
death-it is his desire that the will then be established, published and
its provisions carried out."' No one is in a better position to effec-
tuate the desires of the testator than the attorney who drew the will.
When the reason for the rule of privilege ceases to obtain, the applica-
tion of the rule should cease. The state endows its citizens with the
privilege of testamentary disposition. The burden of proving the
proper exercise of the privilege is on the proponents of the will who
thus represent the testator. Obstacles should not be placed in the
way when there is no justification for their existence. However, the
statute or its application should be qualified so as to apply only to
those cases where the evidence to be adduced is in support of the will.
Otherwise a dangerous weapon will be placed in the hands of un-
scrupulous attorneys who may be induced, by bribe or otherwise, to
use the knowledge obtained through their position of confidence so as
to favor interests detrimental to their erstwhile clients.
SIDNEY MOERMAN.
JURISDICTION OF NON-RESIDENT IMIOTORIST.-By the former
provisions of Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law 1 it was pro-
vided that a non-resident operator of a motor vehicle or motorcycle
should be deemed by such operation on a public highway in this state
to have appointed the secretary of state to be his attorney upon whom
summons might be served in any action against him, growing out of
any accident or collision in which he might have been involved while
engaged in such operation. Further details of the method of effect-
ing such service were contained in the section. The constitutionality
of a Massachusetts statute, similar to ours, was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Hess v. Pawloski.2
testamentary cases are not included within the meaning of the statute; Iowa,
Conway v. Rock, 139 Iowa 162, 117 N. W. 273 (1908) ; and in Arkansas the
common law rule prevails despite a statute similar to the one in New York,
Broadway v. Thompson, 139 Ark. 542, 214 S. W. 27 (1919). See cases col-
lected in American Digest "Witnesses" Key 202 and 217.
U 5 Wigmore, Evidence (1923), Sec. 2314.
Laws of 1929, Ch. 54.
2274 U. S. 13, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632 (1927).
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A casual reading of the former section will reveal the omission
by the Legislature of wording which would make the statute broad
enough to be effective in situations where some one other than the
owner was in fact operating the car, for, as a practical matter, in
nearly every case it is the owner of the vehicle who is sought to be
charged with liability for the negligence, regardless of whether or not
he is the operator; yet the statute clearly provided for service only in
cases of actual operation. Although the enactment of that section
was commendable for its result in adding increased protection to the
rights of our citizens by the abridgement of legal formulae, the law
was of a very limited value because of what it failed to accomplish.
In O'Tier v. Sell 3 the Court of Appeals specifically decided
that Section 52 was limited in its scope as indicated above. In that
case the defendant was not operating the vehicle which he owned, it
being driven by another with his consent. Service having been made
on the defendant as provided by the statute, it was held that the sec-
tion was not sufficiently broad to cover this situation, the owner not
being the operator of the vehicle. The term "operate" as used in
the statute was said by the Court to contemplate the personal act of
working the mechanism.4  O'Tier v. Sell practically nullified the
statute, for it not only settled by implication the inapplication of this
section to corporate defendants and other employers owning vehicles
operated by their employees at their direction, but further made it
plain that the owner of a vehicle, although himself operating it, might
make certain his immunity from the effect of the statute by transfer-
ring the occupation of the driver's seat to another upon commencing
the run over our highways.
Since this decision of the Court of Appeals was handed down,
the Legislature has enacted an amendment to Section 52 which
adds to the former effect of the statute by making "* * * * the
operation on a public highway in this state of a motor vehicle or
motorcycle owned by a non-resident if so operated with his consent,
express or implied, * * * equivalent to an appointment by such non-
resident of the secretary of state to be his true and lawful attorney
upon whom may be served the summons * * *."
The statute as amended apparently remedies all the defects which
made the former section so limited in practical effectiveness. Whether
the new section is repugnant to any Constitutional guarantees is not
altogether free from doubt. The amendment is not in any sense a
mere addition of words to render more workable a statute made in-
effective by inaccurate wording. It presents an entirely different
situation, wherein by its terms it makes possible the service of sum-
mons on a non-resident in the manner specified, who at no time
personally enters the jurisdiction of the state.
SIDNEY HABER.
"252 N. Y. 400, 169 N. E. 624 (1930).4Ibid. at 403, 169 N. E. at 625.
